Abstract: A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972) ) satisfy the CoMa-property.
Introduction
A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. Hence, the core of a game that satisfies the CoMa-property is the convex hull of the marginal vectors that are in the core.
A well-known class of games that satisfy the CoMa-property is the class of convex games: the core of a convex game is the convex hull of all marginal vectors (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ). A non-convex class of games that satisfy the CoMa-property is the class of information games (cf. Kuipers (1993) ), which is a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games (cf. Granot and Huberman (1981) ). In this note we prove that assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972) ) satisfy the CoMa-property.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall some game theoretic notions and introduce the CoMa-property.
A cooperative game with transferable utilities is a pair (P, v) where P is a finite set of players and v : 2 P → IR is a map that assigns to each S ∈ 2 P a real number v(S), such that v(∅) = 0. Here, 2 P is the collection of all subsets (coalitions) of P . Assignment games, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972) , arise from bipartite matching situations. Let M and N be two disjoint sets. For each i ∈ M and j ∈ N the value of a matched pair (i, j) is a ij ≥ 0. From this situation an assignment game is defined in the following way. On the player set M ∪ N , the worth of coalition S ∪ T , S ⊆ M, T ⊆ N is defined to be the maximum that S ∪ T can achieve by making suitable pairs from its members. If S = ∅ or T = ∅ no suitable pairs can be made and therefore the worth in this situation is 0. Formally, an assignment game (M ∪ N, w) is defined by
where M(S, T ) denotes the set of matchings between S and
The core of a game (P, v) consists of all vectors that distribute the gains v(P ) among the players in P in such a way that no subset of players can be better off by seceding from the rest of the players and act on their own behalf. Formally, the core of a game (P, v) is defined by
where x(S) := i∈S x i . A game is balanced if and only if its core is non-empty (cf. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) ). Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that assignment games are balanced. A core allocation x ∈ Core(M ∪ N, w) of an assignment game (M ∪ N, w) will sometimes, for convenience, be denoted by
N , where u and v are the vectors that correspond to the payoffs of the players in M and N , respectively. Let (P, v) be a game. Let Π(P ) be the set of all orderings of P , i.e., bijections π :
Now, we are able to define the CoMa-property for a balanced game. A balanced game (P, v) satisfies the Core is convex hull of Marginals (CoMa-) property if
The CoMa-property for assignment games
The main result of the note is formulated in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property.
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 we need some lemmas. Let (M ∪ N, w) be an assignment game. The following lemma, due to Shapley and Shubik (1972) , gives a set of conditions that is necessary and sufficient for an allocation to be in the core.
Lemma 3.2 Let (M ∪ N, w) be an assignment game and let µ be an optimal matching between
M and N . Let x = (u, v) ∈ IR M × IR N . Then, x ∈ Core(M ∪ N,
w) if and only if the following
four conditions are satisfied:
Let (M ∪ N, w) be an assignment game. Let µ be an optimal matching between M and N . Given a core allocation
, the set of vertices V equals the player set M ∪ N and the edge set is defined by E := {{i, j}|i ∈ M, j ∈ N, and u i + v j = a ij }. In a tight graph we distinguish between two types of edges with respect to µ. All edges corresponding to µ are referred to as thick edges and all other edges are referred to as thin edges. Given a component of a tight graph we can construct a tree 1 that is a subgraph of the component, covers all vertices of the component, and contains all thick edges in the component. Such a tree we call a tight tree. Notice that a tight tree need not be uniquely determined by the tight graph. The following lemma establishes a relation between the extreme points of the core of an assignment game and the components of the corresponding tight graph. To prove the 'if'-part, we assume that each component of the tight graph G w (u, v) contains at least one player with payoff equal to zero. It is sufficient to show that the system
u(S) + v(T ) ≥ w(S ∪ T ) for all S ⊆ M, T ⊆ N
contains |M | + |N | tight equations that are linearly independent. Let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C k be the components of the tight graph G w (u, v) . Let P (C l ) be the set of players corresponding to C l for all l = 1, . . . , k. Each component C l contains a tight tree. Then the system of equations generated by the edges of such a tree is a linearly independent system (cf. Chvátal (1983) ). Hence, we have k l=1 (|P (C l )| − 1) linearly independent tight equations. Combining these equations with the tight equations generated by the players with zero payoff we obtain a system of
The following lemma provides the worth of some specific (r − s)-path coalitions. For two players r, s ∈ P , r = s, that are in the same tight tree, an (r − s)-path coalition consists of all players that are contained in the unique path between r and s, including r and s. Proof. Let ν be the matching between S ∩ M and S ∩ N that 1) covers S if |S| is even and S\{r} if |S| is odd and 2) only consists of pairs that correspond to edges in the (r − s)-path. Then from the definition of ν, the equalities u i + v j = a ij (for all (i, j) ∈ ν), and the fact that the payoff corresponding to vertex r equals 0 it follows that
From the definition of an assignment game and (1) we have that
On the other hand, since (u, v) is a core allocation, the reverse inequality of (2) holds, providing the desired equality. 2
Now, we can prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that if a game arises from another game by adding null players only, then the 'larger' game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the 'smaller' one does. This assertion immediately follows from the well-known fact that the core of the larger game arises by adding 0 components for the null players to any core element of the smaller one. Therefore, we may restrict attention to assignment games ( with (u, v) . The proof consists of three parts. Let µ be an optimal matching between M and N that matches all players in M ∪ N . Let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C k be the components of the tight graph G w (u, v) and let P (C l ) be the set of players corresponding to C l for all l = 1, . . . , k.
where the second equality follows from the assumption and the inequality from the fact that the merger of optimal matchings for S ∩ P (C 1 ), S ∩ P (C 2 ), . . . , S ∩ P (C k ) gives a matching for S. On the other hand, since
w), we have that x(S) ≥ w(S). We conclude that x(S) = w(S).2
For a component 
Proof. Let S j be the set of the first j players in M ∪ N with respect to the ordering π, i.e.,
From the definition of tight sequence and Claim 1 it follows that
where the first equality follows from the definition of a marginal vector and the second equality from
The theorem now follows from Claim 2 and Claim 3. Proof. Let T l be a tight tree of the component C l . Since µ matches all players, it follows from the definition of a component that the vertices of C l , and hence the vertices of T l , form a set of matched pairs (i, j) ∈ µ. Lemma 3.3 implies that there exists a vertex r in the tight tree T l the payoff of which is 0. We take such a vertex r and we call it the root of the tree T l . Now T l is a rooted tree, i.e., a tree with a distinguished vertex -the root. Clearly, the root r determines a direction of the edges as follows. An edge {a, b} in the rooted tree T l is directed from vertex a to vertex b if a is on the unique path from r to b. The directed rooted tree T l with root r is called r-tree. 
